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I. INTRODUCTION

Discretionary appeals currently play a limited role in federal
appellate jurisdiction. But reformers have long argued for a larger role. 1
And any wholesale reform of the current appellate-jurisdiction system
will likely involve additional or expanded opportunities for discretionary
appeals. 2 Some of these will be in the form of subject or category-specific
discretion, like the current Civil Rule 23(f) (which permits discretionary
appeals from class certification decisions). But the more general avenues
* Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to Cassandra Burke Robertson, Michael
Solimine, and Joan Steinman for comments on an earlier draft. And special thanks, as always, to
Nicole Porter.
1. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context,
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1984); Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary
Appellate Review of Non-Final Orders: It’s Time to Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
285 (1999); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993); Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory
Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (1990) [hereinafter Solimine,
Revitalizing].
2. See Bryan Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing
Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 371,
415 (2017) [hereinafter Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie].
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for discretionary appeals—which currently exist primarily in
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—might also expand.
In this essay, I offer some ideas for the future of discretionary
appeals—what form they might take in a reformed system of federal
appellate jurisdiction and how we might learn about their function. I have
three (admittedly preliminary and undeveloped) ideas:
•

First, eliminate all limits on certified appeals under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That provision allows a district court to
certify an interlocutory order for an immediate appeal in civil
cases, which the courts of appeals then have discretion to
review. But—due to the provision’s language and the way
courts have interpreted that language—only some district court
decisions are eligible for § 1292(b) certification. One possible
reform would be to remove any limits on the types of decisions
that could be certified under § 1292(b).

•

Second, give each side in a civil action one opportunity to seek
discretionary appellate review without first obtaining district
court certification. That is, each side gets to try once.
Regardless of whether that petition to appeal is granted or
denied, no party from that side may try again without the
district court first certifying the issue for immediate appeal (or
without using another avenue for discretionary appeals, like
Rule 23(f)).

•

Third, experiment with these or other possible reforms in a
limited number of circuits to see how they work. One of the
main issues with expanding discretionary appeals is
uncertainty about how they will function. How often will
parties seek discretionary review? Can courts of appeals
manage the increased caseload? Or will any increase in
interlocutory discretionary appeals be offset by a reduction in
appeals after a final judgment? We won’t know the answer to
these and other questions without first trying these new rules.
And rather than try nationwide, we might run pilot programs in
smaller circuits (such as the First Circuit) to gain some useful
data.

A wholesale switch to discretionary interlocutory appeals (for which
some have argued) seems unlikely to me. 3 But less-radical reforms seem
plausible. 4 We should accordingly start thinking about what discretionary

3.
4.

See Bryan Lammon, Perlman Appeals After Mohawk, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2016).
See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 415.
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appeals might look like in the future and how we might move towards that
future.
II. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
As a general rule, appeals in federal court must wait until the end of
district court proceedings, when all issues have been decided and all that
remains is enforcing the judgment. 5 But lots of exceptions to that general
rule exist. Some are found in statutes. 6 Others come from rules of
procedure. 7 And still others—indeed, lots of others—come from judicial
decisions. 8
Discretionary appeals currently play a limited role in this system.
Most federal appeals are as of right. 9 That is, the appellants do not need
the appellate court’s permission to take an appeal. Some appeals as of
right come before the end of district court proceedings via one of the
exceptions to the final-judgment rule. But most appeals as of right come
at the end of district court proceedings.

5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone,
the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.”); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (defining a
“final decision” as one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment”); United States v. Williams, 796 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding
that a judgment was appealable if it “end[ed] the litigation and [left] nothing but execution of the
court’s decision, the standard definition of ‘final’ under § 1291.”).
6. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)–(2) (2018) (granting jurisdiction to review decisions refusing
to order arbitration); 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2018) (granting jurisdiction to review government appeals
from orders suppressing or excluding evidence in a criminal proceeding); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
(2018) (granting jurisdiction over appeals from “[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.”); id.
§ 1453(c) (giving the courts of appeals discretion to review orders remanding a case that was removed
under the Class Action Fairness Act).
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (giving the courts of appeals discretion to review orders granting
or denying class certification); FED R. CIV. P. 54(b) (authorizing a district court to enter a final
judgment for some (but not all) of the claims or parties in a case “if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay,” thereby allowing an immediate appeal from orders that would
otherwise have to wait for a final judgment).
8. For overviews of the judge-made exceptions to the final-judgment rule, see generally, e.g.,
THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 42–49 (2d
ed. 2009); Martineau, supra note 1, at 737–46; Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate
Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 360–86 (2010).
9. See Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, the Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 1809, 1811 (2018) (noting that most of the law of federal appellate jurisdiction is built atop
§ 1291) [hereinafter Lammon, Finality].
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Discretionary appeals come before the end of district court
proceedings and are thus interlocutory. 10 And unlike an appeal as of right,
a discretionary appeal requires that the would-be appellant get permission
to appeal. That permission might come from the district court, the court
of appeals, or both. And the court has some amount of discretion as to
whether to grant that permission.
Discretionary appeals come primarily via 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),
which creates a system of dual certification for appeals in civil actions.
When the district court determines “that [an otherwise non-appealable]
order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,”
it can certify that order for an immediate appeal. 11 The would-be appellant
can then petition the court of appeals for permission to appeal. That court
in turn has more-or-less complete discretion over whether to then hear the
appeal. If the appellate court grants the petition, the case then proceeds
like any other appeal.
A few other avenues for discretionary appellate review exist.
Mandamus is probably the most well-known. Though not technically an
appeal, mandamus allows the courts of appeals to review district court
decisions in extraordinary circumstances. 12 The remaining avenues apply
only to certain kinds of decisions or in certain proceedings. For example,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) gives the courts of appeals
discretion to hear appeals from class-certification decisions. A provision
in the Class Action Fairness Act—28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)—gives the courts
of appeals discretion to review remand orders made under that Act. And
in a provision similar to § 1292(b), bankruptcy courts can certify an order
for immediate appeal that the courts of appeals then have discretion to
hear. 13

10. Perhaps the only discretionary appeals that come after the end of district court proceedings
are discretionary appeals of remand orders under the Class Action Fairness Act. See
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2018). Thanks to Michael Solimine for pointing this out.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018). For overviews of appellate mandamus, see Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 351–61 (2012); Adam N.
Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1257–66 (2007).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) (2018). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(1) (2018) (governing
certified appeals from the Court of International Trade); id § 1292(d)(2) (governing certified appeals
from the Court of Federal Claims); 48 U.S.C. § 2166(e)(3) (2018) (governing certified appeals in suits
related to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Security Act).
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By nearly all accounts, the current system of federal appellate
jurisdiction is broken and sorely in need of fixing. 14 The system’s
problems have been extensively covered elsewhere, and I don’t need to
repeat them here. 15 Suffice it to say that the current regime of federal
appeals is complicated and unpredictable, and it doesn’t meet the needs of
modern litigation. 16
Reform has accordingly long been a focus of the appellatejurisdiction literature. When it comes to discretionary appeals, proposed
reforms have taken a few different forms. Some propose discretionary
appellate jurisdiction over particular kinds of district court decisions or in
particular contexts. 17 Others argue for expanding or reinvigorating
existing avenues for discretionary appeals. 18 And still others argue for a
wholesale switch to discretionary interlocutory appeals. 19
I have focused largely on wholesale reform in my work, proposing a
system that combines discretion and categorical rules for appealability.20
14. Lammon, Finality, supra note 9, at 1821–22; Martineau, supra note 1, at 729 (“[T]he
unanimous view of commentators is that the rule has either too many or too few exceptions, but in
any event requires revision.”).
15. See, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate
Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 432–36 (2013) [hereinafter Lammon, Rules]; Steinman, supra
note 12, at 1252–57, 1266–72.
16. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 L &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 165–66 (1984) (noting “the unconscionable intricacy of the existing law,
depending as it does on overlapping exceptions, each less lucid than the next.”); Cooper, supra note
1, at 157 (“The final judgment requirement has been supplemented by a list of elaborations,
expansions, evasions, and outright exceptions that is dazzling in its complexity.”); Eisenberg &
Morrison, supra note 1, at 291 (calling the current system “arcane and confusing”); Lammon, Finality,
supra note 9, at 1815–25; Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem,
47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984) (“The existing federal finality-appealability situation is
an unacceptable morass.”); Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:
Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Torts Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 556 (2002) (noting the
“dizzying array of statutory and judicially-created [finality] exceptions”).
17. See, e.g., Bryan Lammon, Assumed Facts and Blatant Contradictions in QualifiedImmunity Appeals, 55 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 68–69) (suggesting discretionary
appeals for denials of qualified immunity); Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and
Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711, 757–60 (2013) (arguing for discretionary appeals over
decisions that resolve some (but not all) claims in a multi-claim or multi-party action) [hereinafter
Pollis, Rule 54(b)]; Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169, 183 (2019) (suggesting discretionary appeals for denials of
qualified immunity).
18. See generally, e.g., Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1201–05; Steinman, supra note
12, at 1276–82.
19. See Cooper, supra note 1, at 163–64; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 293–302;
Martineau, supra note 1, at 748–87; John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory
Appeals with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214–22. See also Martin H. Redish, The
Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 124–27 (1975).
20. See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 415–16.
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Categorical rules would describe what is (and perhaps what isn’t)
appealable before the end of district court proceedings. 21 Some of those
categorical rules might be discretionary appeals. And all of those rules
would be capped with a discretionary catchall that would cover appeals
that did not fall into any categorical rule. 22 I have argued that this system
(inspired by the hearsay rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence) could
clear up the existing system of federal appellate jurisdiction and make the
system transparent and accessible. 23 And the discretionary catchall would
inject overt flexibility into the system—something that the complexity of
modern federal litigation requires. 24
III. TWO ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
What would the discretionary catchall look like? It could be a blanket
grant of discretion, much like the system proposed by advocates of a
wholesale switch to discretionary interlocutory appeals. Or it could simply
be something similar to what already exists: § 1292(b) and mandamus.
Or it could be something else. And it’s worth thinking about what
that something else might look like. I offer two ideas, both of them
admittedly preliminary and undeveloped. The first is the more modest
one: remove most (or even all) of the limits that currently exist (or seem
to exist) on the use of § 1292(b). The second is more radical: give parties
one opportunity in every action to seek discretionary appellate review
from any district court decision. I’m not saying that we should adopt these
particular rules. I am, however, saying that we need to start thinking about
rules like them. This is accordingly only the start of the discussion.
A.

The Limitless § 1292(b)

Let’s start with § 1292(b). Again, § 1292(b) applies only in civil
cases. And it authorizes the district court to certify a decision for an
immediate appeal. Specifically, it says that district courts “shall” certify
their orders for an immediate appeal when they are “of the opinion that
such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 416–17.
24. Id. at 417; see also Bryan Lammon, Hall v. Hall: A Lose-Lose Case for Appellate
Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1001, 1011 (2018) [hereinafter Lammon, A Lose-Lose Case].
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litigation.” 25 When a district court certifies its decision under this statute,
the would-be appellant then has 10 days to petition the court of appeals
for permission to appeal. 26
Section 1292(b) could be an excellent appellate rule. In theory, it
provides a valuable source of flexibility, allowing immediate appeals
when the district and appellate courts agree that an appeal is warranted.27
The district court’s gatekeeper role—requiring that it first certify an
appeal—limits the provision’s impact on appellate work; there can be only
as many appeals as there are certified decisions. And § 1292(b) avoids
wasteful procedural litigation on jurisdiction. Unlike clunkier avenues for
appeal like the collateral-order doctrine, the court of appeals decides
whether to hear an appeal before any time is spent addressing the issues
that the appeal raises. Michael Solimine, as well as the authors of Federal
Practice and Procedure, have accordingly called for a broad reading and
use of § 1292(b). 28
1. The Problem
At least that’s the theory. In practice, § 1292(b) has proved
unsatisfactory. 29 It is severely underused; district courts are too reluctant
to certify their decisions, and even when they do, courts of appeals are too
stingy with their own discretion. 30 The reasons for this are unclear. It
might be that courts simply disagree with their critics on the
appropriateness of appeals. But there are at least some signs that § 1292(b)
isn’t working as intended. For example, a recent spate of appellate
decisions has used mandamus to reverse—actually or effectively—a
district court’s refusal to certify an order for appeal. 31
25.
26.
27.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
Id.
16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD C. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3930 (3d ed. 1998) (“Ideally, § 1292(b) could be used to allow
interlocutory appeals whenever the district court and court of appeals agree that immediate review is
a good gamble.”).
28. See id.; Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1204–05.
29. See Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1165.
30. See 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“[I]t is clear that § 1292(b) has not made
serious inroads on the final-judgment rule.”); Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1165.
31. See In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2019) (denying mandamus to decide the
plaintiff’s standing to sue but suggesting that the district court certify the merits of the plaintiff’s claim
for a § 1292(b) appeal); In re Trump, 781 F. App’x 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (denying mandamus to
reverse the denial of a § 1292(b) certification but also remanding the matter for “immediate
reconsideration”); In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 372 (4th Cir. 2019) (directing a district court—via a
writ of mandamus—to certify an issue for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)), rehearing
en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019). See also Michael E. Solimine, The Renaissance of

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 5

646

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[53:639

So what’s wrong with § 1292(b)? Commentators have ventured a
few guesses. First and primarily are the ways in which courts have treated
the criteria specified in § 1292(b): a substantial ground for difference of
opinion, a controlling question of law, and material advancement of the
litigation. These criteria might be read as guidelines for the district court
to consider when deciding whether to certify an order. But courts
sometimes speak of these criteria as prerequisites to or requirements for a
§ 1292(b) certification. 32 That is, the district court cannot certify an order
unless all three of these criteria are satisfied. Several courts have added an
extra-textual “big case” requirement to § 1292(b), holding that certified
appeals are appropriate only in “big” or “exceptional” cases. 33
This practice—reading § 1292(b)’s criteria as prerequisites to
certification—poses several problems. For one thing, it unwisely restricts
the category of orders to which § 1292(b) could apply. 34 The three
statutory criteria, and even the extra-textual “big case” requirement, are
all relevant to determining whether an interlocutory appeal is appropriate.
But they’re underinclusive. Lots of district court decisions that fail to meet
one or more of those criteria might merit an immediate appeal. When
applied strictly and cumulatively, these criteria impede the use of
§ 1292(b). 35 When an order doesn’t seem to satisfy one or more of the
criteria, courts must either deny the certification or fudge the criteria.
For another thing, as far as requirements go, § 1292(b)’s are fuzzy
and vague. That’s not a good look for an appellate rule. To see why, it’s
worth considering the components of appellate rules. All appellate rules

Permissive Interlocutory Appeals and the Demise of the Collateral Order Doctrine, 53 AKRON L.
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 7–13).
32. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3930 (“Opinions that elaborate on the reasons for
permitting or refusing to permit appeal, however, tend to reflect a less relaxed attitude that may
interfere with full realization of the statutory purposes. No insuperable barriers have been raised, but
there is a risk that flexible application may be discouraged by opinions that imply restrictive views of
the statutory criteria in expressing the conclusion that interlocutory appeal is not desirable in a
particular case.”).
33. See id.; Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1173, 1193–95.
34. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“The flexible approach to § 1292(b) is far
superior to blind adherence to a supposed need to construe strictly any permission to depart from the
final-judgment rule.”); Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note 1, at 1193 (“The limitation of the statute to
‘big cases,’ and the narrow definitions of the three criteria by which district judges must review
certification motions, have limited use of the statute, at least in some quarters.”).
35. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“So long as the district court has made an order,
the three factors that justify interlocutory appeal should be treated as guiding criteria rather than
jurisdictional requisites . . . . The three factors should be viewed together as the statutory language
equivalent of a direction to consider the probable gains and losses of immediate appeal.”).
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have two components: the conditions under which an appeal is allowed,
and the category of orders to which the rule applies. 36
The conditions under which an appeal are allowed implicate the
familiar rules-versus-standards debate. 37 The conditions of appeal fall
somewhere on a spectrum between a hard-and-fast rule and a flexible,
case-by-case standard. 38 Rule-like requirements for an appeal can be seen
in the final-judgment rule itself: an appeal is proper when the district court
has decided all outstanding issues (though there is still some nuance to
that rule, along with a few exceptions). 39 Standard-like conditions would
be the exercise of discretion over the propriety of an appeal, like Rule
23(f). 40
Separate from the conditions for an appeal is the category of orders
to which an appellate rule applies; that is, the orders that are eligible to be
considered under the relevant conditions for appeal.41 Categories have at
least two dimensions. First, they fall somewhere on a spectrum between
narrow and broad categories. Narrow categories encompass only specific
kinds of orders or circumstances; again, Rule 23(f) (which applies to
class-certification decisions) provides a nice example. Broader categories
apply to all orders in a particular kind of case (e.g., multidistrict litigation,
civil cases) or even all district court decisions (e.g., mandamus).
Categories also fall somewhere on a spectrum, this one between clear
categories and fuzzy ones. 42 A clear category leaves little ambiguity over
whether a particular district court order is eligible for the appellate rule.
The law being the law, some ambiguity is inevitable at the margins.43 But
for the most part, there is little dispute over whether an order fits within—
and can be evaluated under—a particular appellate rule. A fuzzy category

36. See Richard L. Heppner Jr., Conceptualizing Appealability: Resisting the Supreme Court’s
Categorical Imperative, 55 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (draft at 27–29).
37. See id. at 23–25; Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 448–52.
38. See Heppner, supra note 36, at 23–25.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).
40. This does not mean that Rule 23(f) has “standards” for when appeals are proper; it doesn’t,
and the courts of appeals have had to develop criteria for evaluating the propriety of a Rule 23(f)
appeal. I simply mean that the conditions under which an appeal is proper are not defined by hardand-fast rules but instead by considerations that guide the court in its decisionmaking.
41. See Heppner, supra note 36, at 27.
42. See id. at 50–51.
43. See, e.g., Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Investment Plan, 687 F.3d 824, 826 (7th
Cir. 2012) (addressing whether an order modifying the scope of a previously certified class is
appealable under Rule 23(f)); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (addressing whether an order denying a motion to amend a class-certification order revives
the time for taking a Rule 23(f) appeal).
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is the opposite, creating uncertainty about whether an appellate rule
applies to a particular district court order.
I think that clear categories are appropriate for most (if not all)
appellate rules. Clear categories minimize uncertainty and—
importantly—litigation over whether an appellate rule applies to a
particular district court order. They focus attention instead on the
conditions for appeal. That determination can be easy with rule-like
conditions for appeal. Or it can require the exercise of judgment and
discretion with standard-like conditions for appeal. In either case,
attention is focused on whether an appeal is appropriate.
Back to § 1292(b). The appellate court’s role can be easily described:
once the district court has certified a decision, the court of appeals
exercises complete discretion over whether an appeal is appropriate. So
the conditions for appeal are just about as standard-like as they get. And
the category of orders eligible for the appellate court’s discretion is
narrow and clear: any order the district court has certified under
§ 1292(b).
At the district court level, § 1292(b) seems to couple a fuzzy category
with a standard-like exercise of discretion. Reading § 1292(b)’s criteria as
requirements—i.e., the district court cannot certify an order unless those
requirements are met—creates uncertainty and litigation over whether an
order is eligible for certification. It’s not clear from the get-go whether
these criteria are satisfied. Opinions can differ on whether a question is
controlling or whether a substantial ground for disagreement exists or
whether an appeal would advance the litigation or even whether a question
is one of law. 44 This means uncertainty and litigation over eligibility,
which can distract from the more important issue of whether the order in
question should be immediately appealed.
The situation is even worse when you couple this vague category
with an arguably discretionary determination. It’s not clear whether
district courts are supposed to make a discretionary (as opposed to
mandatory) decision on certification. 45 But if their decision is
44. See generally 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3930; Solimine, Revitalizing, supra note
1, at 1172–74.
45. The legislative history says that the district court’s decision is discretionary. See 16
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3929 (“[T]he appeal is discretionary rather than a matter of right. It
is discretionary in the first instance with the district judge . . . .”). See also id. (“The initial
determination that appeal is desirable is confided to the discretion of the district judge, relying on the
criteria specified in the statute.”); BAKER, supra note 8, at 59. But the statute’s use of the term “shall”
has led some to argue that the district court has only limited discretion in certifying an order under
§ 1292(b). See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court:
A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 779–81 (2006).
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discretionary, all the worse. There is little use in coupling uncertainty over
eligibility with uncertainty over appealability. That simply invites two
disputes instead of one. And given the vagueness of the eligibility
determination, the two will almost inevitably overlap. A lot of time and
effort could be saved by instead focusing directly on the latter question of
whether the order should be appealed.
In practice, it might be the case that district courts are marking
flexible, pragmatic decisions about the appropriateness of an appeal under
the auspices of § 1292(b)’s criteria. That is, even if they speak in terms of
requirements, district courts might actually be exercising the discretion
that I think is appropriate in this circumstance. But then we have covert
flexibility. This is good insofar as it allows for discretion. But I’m no fan
of covert flexibility; flexibility should be overt so that the parties know
what to argue about and the district court can candidly explain the basis
for its decision. 46
Or it might be the case that courts are not, in practice, applying
§ 1292(b) flexibly. That means rigid, formalistic decisionmaking that is
anathema to our current regime of federal appellate jurisdiction. And
that’s even worse. Flexibility is necessary for a working system of
appeals, and § 1292(b) is currently the best (and perhaps the only
appropriate) outlet for that flexibility. 47
2. No Limits
We cannot know for certain how much the textual (and non-textual)
limits and uncertainties in § 1292(b) are impeding its use. But these limits
and uncertainties don’t serve much of a purpose. The rule accordingly
might improve were we to remove them as strict preconditions to an
appeal. That is, a limitless § 1292(b) might finally accomplish the sound
use of discretionary appeals that both Michael Solimine and Wright,
Miller & Cooper have separately advocated. This does not mean that
courts would be completely at sea when deciding the propriety of an
appeal; the statute could include guidance, or the courts could develop
their own. But the analysis would no longer rigidly require satisfying
certain underinclusive, cumulative requirements.
What would this rule look like? Section 1292(b) currently reads:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order

46.
47.

See Lammon, Dizzying Gillespie, supra note 2, at 417.
See Lammon, A Lose-Lose Case, supra note 24, at 1011.
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involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in
its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if
application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not
stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court
of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order. 48

A reformed—and limitless—§ 1292(b) might say:
In a civil action, a district court may certify an order for an immediate
appeal. The court of appeals that would have jurisdiction over an appeal
in that action may then permit an appeal to be taken from that order.
Application to the court of appeals must be made within 10 days. And
application for an appeal under this section does not stay district court
proceedings unless the district court or the court of appeals so orders.

Let’s break this down a bit. First, the limit to civil cases is retained
(I’ll return to this in a moment). Second, by saying “a district court may
certify,” the revised rule removes any doubt that the district court has
discretion to certify; no more “shalls.” Third, there is no suggestion of any
prerequisites to the district court’s certification; the court can exercise its
judgment to determine whether it thinks a decision warrants an immediate
appeal. The rest is more or less the same; the court of appeals has
discretion to accept the appeal, the petition must be filed within 10 days,
and district court proceedings are not stayed without an appropriate order.
These revisions focus both the district court and the court of appeals
on the central question: would this decision benefit from immediate
appellate review? Courts would likely develop standards governing both
exercises of discretion. But those standards would be just that—standards,
which would guide the parties in making their arguments and the courts
in making their decisions. And perhaps most importantly, courts would
make those decisions in procedurally appropriate circumstances—directly
tackling the appropriateness of an appeal before any time is wasted on the
merits of that appeal (unlike they currently do in, for example, the
collateral-order doctrine context).
A revised § 1292(b) could also eliminate the need for Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b) allows the district court to certify for
an immediate appeal an order that resolves some (but not all) of the claims
48.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
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in a multi-party or multi-claim suit. If the district court so certifies—
finding that there is “no just reason for delay”—the parties then have a
right to appeal. While Rule 54(b) might at first seem useful and even
pragmatic, Andrew Pollis has revealed its problems. 49 Rule 54(b)’s terms
create uncertainty and disputes over whether a decision is eligible for a
certification. And the rule gives the district court power to control
appellate jurisdiction, occasionally creating a power struggle between the
district and appellate courts. Pollis accordingly suggested reforming
§ 1292(b) to add a provision for double-certified discretionary appeals
from orders that resolve a party’s entitlement to relief on a particular legal
theory. 50 A limitless § 1292(b) would make Pollis’s suggested change
unnecessary, as it could handle the orders that Rule 54(b) normally would.
And like Pollis’s suggestion, a limitless § 1292(b) would appropriately
direct those matters to the discretion of both the district court and appellate
court.
One last note. Section 1292(b) currently applies only in civil cases.
Arguments have been made to expand it to criminal cases. 51 As of now, I
have no opinion on whether doing so is wise; it’s an issue to which I have
not given enough thought. I will note that pushes for increased appeals are
less common (though hardly nonexistent) in the criminal context. And
courts regularly emphasize the need to limit interlocutory appeals in
criminal proceedings. 52 But I leave this issue for another day.
B.

The One-Opportunity Appeal

Even this revised § 1292(b) still requires double certification. What
about appeals solely at the discretion of the courts of appeals? Again, a
move to this has long been advocated, fueled in part by dissatisfaction
with the district court’s gatekeeper role under § 1292(b). And absolute
discretion has some benefits. It would place a check on district courts
trying to force a settlement with decisions that are insulated from appeals.
And there are likely occasions in which appellate courts think an

49. See generally Pollis, Rule 54(b), supra note 17.
50. Id. at 760.
51. See generally Daniel J. Adelman, Comment, Time Is of the Essence: The Case for
Amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Permit Interlocutory Appeals in Criminal Cases, 1986 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 727 (1986); Raymond A. Hayward, Note, Amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to Permit
Interlocutory Appeals in Federal Criminal Proceedings—An Economic Analysis, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 1037 (1982).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Sueiro, 946 F.3d 637, 640 (4th Cir. 2020).
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immediate appeal is warranted regardless of what the district court
thinks. 53
But one persistent concern with a wholesale switch to discretion is
impact on appellate caseloads. 54 Reform efforts are sensitive to increasing
appellate caseloads. 55 And it’s at least plausible that a wholesale switch to
discretion would increase appellate workloads. Even if appellate courts
were chary of granting permission to appeal—and thus actual appeals did
not increase beyond the courts’ capabilities—the courts of appeals would
still have to deal with an increased number of petitions to appeal. 56
Petitions to appeal are almost certainly less work than full-blown appeals.
But they’re not nothing. And allowing litigants to seek discretionary
appeals from any district court decision creates at least a realistic chance
that the courts of appeals will be inundated with petitions to appeal. This
increased workload might be temporary—litigants might adjust to the new
reality. Multiple appeals in a single case, however, could very well
become common.
Balancing the costs and benefits of discretionary appeals thus likely
requires limiting their number. Section 1292(b) did that by requiring that
litigants first obtain permission from the district court. 57 Other forms of
discretionary appeals (such as Rule 23(f) and § 1453(c)) limit the number
of petitions to appeal by limiting those petitions to a specific kind of order;
there can only be as many petitions to appeal as there are orders of that
type. But there might be other ways.
One possibility comes from Kenneth Kilbert’s recent proposal for
“challenge appeals.” Inspired by instant-replay review in sports, Kilbert
offered a rule whereby “plaintiff and defendant each has the right to
appeal one interlocutory order in the case immediately to the court of
appeals, without the need for any permission by a judge.” 58 As Kilbert
saw it, challenge appeals would open interlocutory appeals to a wide
variety of orders, provide certainty over appealability, reduce procedural

53. See the mandamus/§ 1292(b) cases cited supra note 31.
54. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 433–34; Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and
Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 236–40
(2001).
55. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 433–34.
56. See Bryan Lammon, Appellate Jurisdiction in Sanchez-Gomez: A Hard Case that Should
Be Easy, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2018).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
58. Kenneth K. Kilbert, Instant Replay and Interlocutory Appeals, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 267,
269 (2017).
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litigation over what can be appealed, and keep the number of interlocutory
appeals manageable. 59
Kilbert’s proposal is fascinating. But I’m concerned about its impact
on appellate workloads. The rule would allow for two interlocutory
appeals as of right in every case. If those challenge appeals are coupled
with an appeal from a final judgment, we then have three full trips to the
court of appeals in a single case. To be sure, we don’t know how
frequently that would occur. But it’s a risk.
I offer a variation on Kilbert’s idea. Rather than give both sides the
right to one appeal, give them each one opportunity to seek a discretionary
appeal. That is, each side could would have one chance to ask the court of
appeals for permission to appeal any district court decision. They would
have a short window in which to petition—say, 14 days from the order.
And at some point before trial, they would lose this opportunity had they
not used it—say, after the final pretrial order or when jury selection
begins. Regardless of whether a side’s petition to appeal is granted or
denied, that side cannot ask again. Or, at least, they couldn’t ask again
under this rule; other discretionary options like § 1292(b) and Rule 23(f)
would still exist.
Rather than risk two interlocutory appeals as of right, giving each
side only the opportunity to seek appellate review would mean a
maximum of two petitions for interlocutory appeal. A cap thus exists on
the number of requests for discretionary review. Granted, the number is
somewhat arbitrary. There could be cases in which several interlocutory
appeals were warranted (but that a district court, for whatever reason,
would refuse to certify under § 1292(b)). And there certainly will be cases
in which no interlocutory appeals are needed. The rule would thus be both
under- and overinclusive. But at least there’s a cap.
Further, the use-it-and-lose-it nature of the appeal might make some
litigants never use it. Some litigants might want to save their chance at an
interlocutory appeal in case a particularly important district court decision
doesn’t go their way. Those litigants might pass on several orders from
which they could have sought review. And the important order that they
were waiting for might never come; once the final pretrial order is issued
(or jury selection begins, or whatever), they can no longer seek permission
to appeal. The rule thus mixes incentives and uncertainty to further
discourage the use of this procedure.
Limits would need to exist when one side comprises multiple parties.
And I think Kilbert handled this issue well in his recommendation for
59.

Id. at 299–302.
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challenge appeals. 60 One option would be to give each individual party its
own one-opportunity appeal. But that would be too much. Keeping the
number of petitions to appeal low is a key feature of this proposal. Giving
each individual party a shot at an interlocutory appeal could mean dozens
of attempts in larger suits.
The better option is to give each side one opportunity to seek
discretionary review. This makes especially good sense for plaintiffs, who
generally are the masters of their claims and choose who’s on their side. 61
It’s different for defendants, who have little say in who their co-parties
are and might even be adverse to them. But they, too, should ultimately
be limited to one appeal. Defendants often have much in common and
sometimes even work jointly. 62 They do not have to become adverse in
litigation, since cross-claims are permissive. 63 And allowing one side
multiple attempts at appeal loses one of the key limits for one-opportunity
appeals: the limit on the number of petitions that could be filed in a single
case. So in cases of multiple defendants, as with multiple plaintiffs, the
first mover gets the chance at an appeal. 64 That being said, nothing is
stopping the parties on one side from agreeing among themselves that they
unanimously agree about the propriety of taking their side’s appeal. 65
Another option for dealing with multiple parties is to make them
share the one opportunity to seek a discretionary appeal. That is, there
would be only one opportunity per case for anybody to seek appellate
review. Whichever party took the opportunity first would get it. That
would mean only one potential petition to appeal in each action, further
reducing appellate workloads. How parties would use these appeals is not
entirely clear. Parties might swiftly take their first opportunity to appeal
to deprive their opponent of that chance. Or the rule might result in a
standoff—each waiting nervously for an order they want to appeal—with
neither party taking an appeal until a crucial decision.
One final variation on these kinds of appeals—particularly if they’re
limited to only one appeal in each action rather than one per side—is to
require that parties agree to the use of the procedure. That is, neither party
would be able to unilaterally seek a discretionary appeal. The parties
would instead have to agree on what to try and appeal. This is similar to a

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 309–12.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 310. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g).
Kilbert, supra note 58, at 311.
Id. at 311–12.
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procedure proposed by James Pfander and David Krohn. 66 They
suggested that parties be should be allowed to agree to ask the district
court to certify an issue for immediate appeal. 67 This final variation on the
one-opportunity appeal would similarly operate by the agreement of the
parties, though they would go straight to the court of appeals with their
request.
There is also (and again) the question of whether this rule would
apply in criminal cases. Again, and for much the same reasons as a
limitless § 1292(b), I have no position on that matter at this time.
IV. CIRCUIT EXPERIMENTATION
Just proposing new discretionary-appeal rules won’t be enough.
Debate persists over how any appellate-jurisdiction reform—
discretionary or otherwise—would work in practice. 68 And that debate
sometimes seems interminable and irreconcilable. 69
Part of the difficulty stems from defining “work”; that’s a valueladen judgment, and reasonable minds can disagree over the merits of
particular appellate rules. But another problem comes from a lack of
information on which those judgments should be based. The
consequences of most proposed appellate reforms are uncertain. 70 We can
predict a rule’s effects—such as the frequency with which district court
proceedings would be interrupted and appellate workloads would be
increased—based on reasonable assumptions about litigant and court
behavior. 71 And we can even be fairly confident in some of those
predictions. But those predictions might very well be wrong. We can
sometimes look to similar state practices for data. But efforts to look to
the states have been criticized, as unique aspects of federal litigation
(greater complexity, well-resourced parties) can render state experience
unhelpful. 72 In short, we don’t really know what any discretionary system
would look like in practice. And uncertainty over the consequences of any
particular appellate reform can stand in the way of adopting that reform.
66. See generally James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by
Agreement of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043 (2011).
67. See id. at 1053.
68. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 432–36.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 434.
71. See id. at 436.
72. Compare Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 1, at 297–301 (relying on Wisconsin’s
experience with discretionary appeals to argue for a move to discretionary appeals in the federal
system), and Martineau, supra note 1, at 777–87 (same), with Glynn, supra note 54, at 236–37
(doubting the relevance of the Wisconsin experience to federal appeals).
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Some information on the consequences of particular appellate rules
might help. And one way to learn about the consequences of an appellate
rule is to try it. I once proposed judicial experimentation as a means for
learning about different appellate rules.73 I suggested that courts could use
the collateral-order doctrine to craft rules allowing particular orders to be
appealed. 74 Courts could then apply that rule for a period of years and
learn how it operates. If need be, courts could eventually revise or
abandon the rule.
I now doubt the feasibility (not to mention likelihood) of this kind of
judicial experimentation. The collateral-order doctrine is an awkward tool
for crafting appellate rules. And courts don’t seem to have much interest
in experimenting with these rules.
But experimentation is still possible. Rulemakers (with a little help
from Congress) can craft appellate rules, too. 75 We could thus try
appellate rules via rulemaking—those I’ve proposed or others, such as
Kilbert’s or Pfander and Krohn’s—to see how they work. And doing so
does not require adopting a rule nationwide. Congress could instead
authorize one or more circuits to experiment with appellate rules. The
Supreme Court (via the rulemaking process) could then create those rules,
and the Federal Judicial Center could monitor their operation. Eventually
rulemakers could better assess a proposed appellate rule and predict how
it would function nationwide.
This would likely require congressional action. Although the
Supreme Court has the authority to create procedural rules on
appealability, the Rules Enabling Act requires that those rules be
“general.” 76 Creating special procedural rules for one or more circuits thus
seems problematic under the existing statutes. But Congressional action
could fix this. Indeed, circuit experimentation is not entirely novel. In
1998, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals (commonly called the “White Commission” after its chair,
Justice Byron White) suggested empowering the courts of appeals to
create intra-circuit divisions as they grow. 77 The Commission suggested
legislation that would create these divisions in the Ninth Circuit, with the
Federal Judicial Center monitoring that circuit’s experience for eight

73. See Lammon, Rules, supra note 15, at 445–59.
74. See id.
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
77. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
FINAL REPORT 61 (1998).
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years. 78 After the eight-year experiment, the Judicial Conference would
have made recommendations to Congress on the further use of divisions. 79
As for where any experimentation might take place, circuits with
lower caseloads are probably the best candidates. One major (if not the
major) concern with increased discretionary appeals is appellate
caseloads. It thus makes sense to experiment with new avenues for appeals
where caseloads are already low. That way, if the experiment goes
horribly wrong and caseloads increase substantially, the court will
hopefully still be able to manage its business through the course of the
experiment.
That probably means the First, Tenth, or D.C. Circuits. 80 They each
have a relatively low absolute number of appeals and a relatively low
number of decisions-per-judge. 81 So they are probably best positioned to
absorb any increase in appellate workloads. These lower workloads also
suggest that the First, Tenth, or D.C. Circuits would be good barometers
for the workability of an appellate rule; if something cannot work in the
Tenth Circuit, it probably won’t work in the Ninth. This isn’t to say that
success in any of these circuits means that a rule would function well
nationwide. Circuit differences in caseloads as well as staffing, internal
procedures, and even cultures might affect the consequences of a new
appellate rule. But trying new appellate rules where they are most likely
to function is at least a start.
V. CONCLUSION
The next several decades will hopefully see some reform of federal
appellate jurisdiction. Granted, the literature has pushed reform for years.
But sustained efforts—with new visions for appellate timing and
information on how new structures might function—might make reform
more likely. It’s accordingly worth considering what a reformed system
of appellate jurisdiction might look like. I’ve offered three ideas for
78. Id. at 95.
79. Id. at 43.
80. The Federal Court Management Statistics Summary includes the number of cases
terminated on the merits per active judge for the past 12 months. In the 12-month period ending
September 30, 2019, the First, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits each terminated 447, 228, and 210 cases per
judge. The Tenth and D.C. Circuit numbers are the two lowest. Four circuits have a lower number of
merits terminations per judge than the First Circuit: the Second (389), Third (424), Sixth (292), and
Seventh (366). But each of those four circuits has a much greater total caseload than the First does.
See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS SUMMARY—12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2019,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_appsumary0930.2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PD6S-CJST].
81. See id.
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discretionary appeals, but there are many more possibilities. And we
should start finding ways to break the empirical impasse that hinders
serious consideration of new appellate rules.
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